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Buell: Conceptualizations of Contemporary Global Culture

CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF
CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL CULTURE

FREDERICK BUELL
In 1969, Herbert Schiller wrote that "the cultural homogenization that has been underway for years threatens to overtake the
globe" (112). "The new cultural-ideological structures of the emergent nauon," he went on, "are no less vulnerable to the glittering
socio-cultural products of the already developed world than the
new industries of the aspiring states are to the giant corporations
of the industrialized west" (120). Concerned specifically with the
development of global media, he advocated a kind of electronic
delinking to prevent the eradication of vulnerable cultures. His
sense of urgency was fueled by the conviction that "mistakes and
failures in agriculture and industry, if momentarily disastrous, are
still remediable. Culture patterns, once established, are endlessly
persistent" (110).
Liberal Jeremiads against homogenization are commonplace.
Implied in most is the notion that the world is a patchwork of
primordially separate, bounded cultural units, and that these units
enter the geo-political arena via the structures of emerging nations. According to the ideology of the nation-state, a distinctive
culture legitimizes the emerging state, which then reciprocally
protects that culture.
Recently though, laments about homogenization have been
sounding, paradoxically, more like celebrations of the opposite.
For William Roseberry, "Americanization" in Latin America evokes
the following associations:
we think of office buildings for local oudets of multinationals, of McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken, of Exxon and Coca Cola signs,
of television stations carrying Spanish language versions of "Dallas" or
"Dynasty," of mass-market magazines carrying translations of articles from
People, of stores selling plastic pumpkins and Halloween costumes and
children going door to door saying Trick or Treat, Trick or Treat, Tiene
dulces para mi? (81)
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Roseberry's comments are less lament than a stylish recreation of
a too-familiar genre: Roseberry intends this effect, as he goes on
to argue that many of the premises for traditional fears about
homogenization in Latin America are false. They are based on a
belief in distinctive primordial cultural units, which is historically
inaccurate, and they omit consideration of important, non-monolithic mechanisms by which local cultures interiorize and indigenize outside influences, rather than swallow them whole hog.
A still more striking revision of the usual lament can be found
throughout Pico Iyer's Video Nights in Kathmandu. Typical of the
travelogue through an Asia transformed by American popular
culture is his chapter on Bali:
I had come into town the previous afternoon watching video reruns of
Dance Fever on the local bus. As I wandered around, looking for a place
to stay, I noted down the names of a few of the stores: the Hey Shop.
The Hello Shop. Easy Rider Travel Service. T.G.I. Friday restaurant.
After checking into a modest guesthouse where Vivaldi was pumping
out of an enormous ghetto blaster, I had gone out in search of a meal.
I ran across a pizzaria, a sushi bar, a steak house, a Swiss restaurant and
a slew of stylish Mexican cafes. (29)

Lament has utterly disappeared; it has been transformed into a
carnival-like celebration of hybridism and heterogeneity. When
American popular culture is grafted onto Eastern locations, the
effect is not assimilation but the creation of starding, boundaryviolating artifice everywhere. Iyer makes clear that the process of
absorption of American popular culture is complex: with a few
exceptions, people have consciously taken it over and deployed it
in transformative ways, rather than making themselves over in its
image as a part of the process of their domination.
Changes in this micro-genre are related to changes in what is a
vasdy more significant discourse, one that Roland Robertson has
called "a vital ingredient of global-political culture," the "discourse
of [global] mapping" (25). To show the full significance of these
shifts in rhetoric about homogenization, I shall analyze a series of
these underlying attempts to map the globe, focusing on how they
describe global cultural relationships differendy and how they
define and deploy the term "culture" in different ways.
One of the most influential refigurations of the world according to Schiller has occurred in World Systems thought. In Imman-
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uel Wallerstein'swork, the supposedly separate cultures that, since
the 1955 Bandung Conference, were grouped into first, second,
and third worlds were revealed as having been, all along, parts of
a single system—not parts that simply made up a larger system,
but parts that had actually been made by that larger system. True,
first, second, and third world were reborn in Wallerstein's concepts of core, semi-periphery, and periphery; nonetheless, they
were not autonomous entities, but creations of the overarching
system. If Wallerstein, in economics, destroyed the developmentalist's fiction of independently trackable, separate cultures, Eric
Wolf, to whose analysis Roseberry was indebted, attacked the anthropologist's notion of separate, bounded, primordial cultures,
by showing how societies people had taken as primordial were in
fact created by the expanding colonial world system. As he wrote
in Europe and the People Without History, "the more ethnohistory we
know, the more clearly 'their' history and 'our' history emerge as
parts of the same history" (19).
In a recent article, "Culture as the Ideological Batdeground,"
Wallerstein applies to the world system Marx's famous distinction
between base and superstructure, between "the material transformations of the economic conditions of production" and the "ideological . . . forms in which men become conscious of this conflict
and fight it out" (Marx, 12). To do this, Wallerstein isolates two
different definitions of the word "culture": "culture," meaning what
distinguishes groups, like nations, from each other, and "culture"
meaning what creates distinctions within groups. Peoples have
particular "cultures"; within one people, some, the elite, have "culture." These two usages, Wallerstein argues, have no objective,
material reality, but are "the consequence of the historical development of [the capitalist world] system and reflect its guiding logic"
(32). They serve to mystify people about the real nature of the
system's contradictions and thereby help keep it firmly in place.
Wallerstein then shows how this process operates by charting
the way two particular ideologies, the "ideologies of universalism
and of racism-sexism," work in the world system. These ideologies
use the two notions of culture to keep the underlying system intact. On the one hand, universalism serves as a "palliative and
deception" to mask the "hierarchy of states within the interstate
system and a hierarchy of citizens within each sovereign state" (43);
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at the same time it holds out the false promise of equality for all,
it justifies those at the top of the hierarchy as the possessors of the
"universal" culture. Correspondingly, racism-sexism legitimizes
inequality and hierarchy by creating invidious group distinctions
on the interstate and intrastate levels.
To these purely system-created differences, Wallerstein adds
another order of system-created difference: that of "antisystemic
movements" which are "at the same time a product of the system"
(51). These are, he feels, too ambivalent and compromised to be
effective at present. For our purposes, such uncertainty is not
important; what is crucial is that Wallerstein conceptualizes the
world as a single system which does not homogenize, but produces, systematically, a number of orders of cultural difference. Wallerstein thus lays the cornerstone for contemporary thought about
global culture not as the effacement of separate cultures by an
homogenizing hegemony, but as the manufacture of new orders
of cultural difference by a system that has already included everyone.
Compared to positions we shall entertain shordy, Wallerstein's
theory is conservative in a number of ways. First, his conceptualization of the world system is hierarchical and centrist; movement
between core, semi-periphery, and periphery is hard to achieve.
Second, his concept of culture lags behind that of much recent
Marxist cultural criticism; culture is merely a handmaiden of the
system, masking its contradictions. Wallerstein's theory denies
culture the oppositional role Gramsci allows for, and it does not
engage itself with recent theory, like structural Marxism, that would
privilege the analysis of culture equally with economics as an analysis of power, thereby discovering more relationships between the
two realms than one finds in Wallerstein. Finally, Wallerstein's
thought stays firmly within the model of the nation state. More
radical conceptions of system-created cultural difference will argue, as Wallerstein does, that nation-states are essentially fictional
creations of the world system, but they will go on to chart the
emergence of a more fragmented, post-national global system.
Equally important, they will see that system as decentered rather
than centric; and they will give cultural production a more important, even formative role in it. In the course of these changes,
orders of cultural difference created by a single world system will
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be multiplied, and the carnival of hybridism we found in Pico Iyer
will seem normadve, not eccentric.
The Marxist literary critic Frederic Jameson conducts a far richer investigation of the relations between culture and the world
system than Wallerstein. Jameson theorizes that a close analysis of
cultural products can make explicit the political unconscious of
an age. For Jameson, postmodern art, literature, architecture, and
media reveal the fact that we are in a new phase of capitalism.
Following Ernest Mandel Jameson describes this new stage as follows: it is
the moment of the multinational network, or what Mandel calls "late
capitalism," a moment in which not merely the older city but even the
nation-state itself has ceased to play a functional and formal role in a
process that has in a new quantum leap of capital prodigiously expanded beyond them, leaving them behind as ruined and archaic remains of
earlier stages in the development of this new mode of production. (1988:
350)

This new stage of capitalism is accompanied by a sea-change in
literary representation, the development of postmodernist style.
Jameson describes its peculiarities as
symptoms and expressions of a new and historically original dilemma,
one that involves our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from
the still surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable decentering of global capital itself. Not even Einsteinian
relativity, or the multiple subjective worlds of the older modernists, is
capable of giving any kind of adequate figuration to this process which
in lived experience makes itself felt by the so-called death of the subject,
or, more exacdy, the fragmented and schizophrenic decentering and
dispersion of this last which can no longer even serve the function of
the Jamesian reverberator or "point of view." (1988: 351)

In postmodern style, then, the "unimaginable decentering of
global capital" is visible; the post-national, globalizing world system produces a fragmented, heterogeneous cultural style, one that
circulates decontextualized cultural fragments drawn from around
the world and throughout history. This circulation is driven by
the mechanism of consumer society, because postmodern culture
is commercial, not oppositional. Jameson's position is thus oddly,
distandy, related to conceptions of the new global culture as a
kind of "third" culture, one that is seen as built above, or built
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against, national cultures. WhatJameson sees as decentering selves
and national cultures, these theorists describe, with more permissive, less catastrophic rhetoric, as the basis for the construction of
new selves and a new culture—the new selves and culture of the
culturally-decontextualized and cosmopolitan. Anthony Smith, for
example, argues that today's cultural imperialisms are "ostensibly
non-national,'' replacing the national imperialisms of colonial
times and the more recent "supranatural" imperialisms of capitalism and socialism. Summarizing the argument for the creation of
a new global culture on this basis—an argument he only partially
agrees with—Smith notes that it will "wear a uniformly streamlined packaging" and take its contents in part from "traditional,
folk or national motifs and styles in fashion, furnishings, music
and the arts, lifted out of their original contexts and anaesthesized" (176). This global culture will be ultimately "context-less, a
true melange of disparate components drawn from everywhere
and nowhere, borne on the modern chariots of global telecommunications systems" (177).
Scott Lash and John Urry, in their book The End of Organized
Capitalism, draw heavily on and also revise Jameson's and Jean
Baudrillard's concepts of postmodern culture. The most important revision for our purposes is the fact that Lash and Urry give
Jamesonian postmodernism a specific class location, rather than
take it as a privileged window on the underlying structures of late
capitalism; correspondingly, they see the current stage of capitalism as a disorganization of the Marxian system, rather than a transformation that extends it into a new period. Postmodern culture
is thus attached to one particular component of this disorganized
system: Lash and Urry argue that the "developing service class
[is] the consumer par excellance of post-modern cultural products"
(292). The rise of postmodern culture represents that class' attempt at cultural hegemony and helps show how that class is constituted so as to make "the decentered identity which fosters the
reception of such post-modern cultural goods" (292). Lash and
Urry make a bias ofJameson's system clear: the postmodern culture Jameson describes is structurally a first-world phenomenon.
A similar first-world centrism is built into the theories of global
commercial culture that Anthony Smith cited. In all these theories, the core is culturally fragmented and globalized. The periph-
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ery, however, lags behind, caught in the quaint backwater of the
ideology of the nation state and the stage of industrial capital.
Post-structuralism has given rise to a variety of cultural theories
that argue for a more radical, worldwide form of system-created
heterogeneity. In these, the nation-state model is abandoned completely, both core and periphery are pluralized, and hierarchical
relationships between the two are undone. In a wide variety of
disciplines, culture has been analyzed neither as the expression of
authentic primordial units, nor as the tool of power that remains
in the economic base, but as an effective form of power—of power that is reconceived as widely diffused, or, better, dispersed
thoughout sociocultural life. Cultural studies investigate how hegemonic social formations are constructed simultaneously—yet
heterogeneously—in culture, knowledge, and social, political, and
economic institutions.
Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault have been, of course,
dominant influences in many of these enterprises. Derrida's influence is evident in attempts to expose the imperfecdy-concealed
illegitimacy of centered textual and social structures, by showing
the multiplicity they really involve but try to exclude; indebtedness to Foucault is shown in an anti-Marxian resistance to retotalizing knowledge about culture and power in either an Euclidian
"world system" or a clear evolutionary narrative. Clearly, when such
techniques of analysis are applied to the Wallerstinian world system, they are disruptive: the notion of a single system is shown to
be much more complex than anyone thought. Systemic unity and
singularity are decomposed into an interactive, yet interruptive,
contradictory multiplicity; as the world becomes increasingly systematically interconnected, it grows paradoxically more complex,
heterogenous, and impossible to grasp in a synthetic whole.
From a variety of positions, then, Herbert Schiller's assumptions
about primordial cultures have been even more thoroughly exposed as motivated, fictional constructions than they were by
Wallerstein and Wolf; the fiction of separate cultures was created
not just by the operation of a single economic system, but by a
multitude of related, but not wholly uniftable, colonial discourses. Thus, to pick a very few examples, Edward Said's Orientalism
unmasked the Western concept of the "Orient" and "oriential
culture" as an interdisciplinary construction of Imperialist power
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and knowledge; Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm called attention to a fascinating variety of "invented traditions," deployed
by capitalist society at home and colonial powers abroad in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, traditions that were supposedly primordial but were outrageous, even fantastic constructions.
Sally Price analyzed the neo-colonial construction by anthropologists and art historians of the categories "primitive culture" and
"primitive art"; James Clifford has seen cultural relativism as a last
ditch attempt to contain the upsettingly interrelated multiplicity
of the postcolonial world, a "response to a pervasive modern feeling, linking the Irishman Yeats to the Nigerian Achebe, that "things
fall apart" (65) Perhaps most devastatingly, Benedict Anderson
has analyzed the rise of nationalism and its notion of national
cultures as the emergence, in history, of a peculiar sort of "cultural artefact," one which was created, in part, by cultural means.
These means include the novel and the newspaper, which helped
to construct their readers as citizens of a nation, and a variety of
linguistic, historical, and cultural research, which produced—even
invented—national traditions. Once created, the "artefact" was
disseminated "modularly" throughout the world, most recendy
when it was adopted by colonized peoples in their struggles for
incorporation and liberation.
These analyses show how the world is constructed in a wide
variety of internationally-disseminated discourses. Crucial to this
multiplicity is the intimation that what has been so plurally constructed can be also deconstructed, even reconstructed: there is a
sense of much greater dispersion and fluidity of power than was
available in the Marxist model, along with a sense that theory,
cultural criticism, and cultural production can still have, as they
formerly did have, considerable impact on the structuring of the
world.
Such an empowerment of culture is obvious in contemporary
literary and cultural studies. A wide variety of intellectual movements have sprung up, from a renewed ethnic studies, to Imperial
discourse theory, post-colonial literary and cultural studies, literary feminism, neo-marxist cultural studies, literary deconstructionism, and so on. Also, in the case of the canon dispute in North
America, debate has been extremely public and political. The
debate is too various to summarize here; I shall pick one example
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from the realm of post-colonial cultural studies. Timothy Brennan describes, from his perspective in the English "core," how, in
cultural production and analysis, dissolution of the coherence of
the core goes hand in hand with disruption of the hierarchy between core and periphery:
the wave of successful anti-colonial struggles from China to Zimbabwe
has contributed to the forced attention now being given in the Englishspeaking world to the point of view of the colonized—and yet it is a
point of view that must increasingly be seen as part of English speaking
culture. It is a situation, as the Indo-English author Salman Rushdie
points out, in which English, 'no longer an English language, now grows
from many roots; and those whom it once colonized are carving out
large territories within the language for themselves.' . . . [I]n turn, such
voices from afar give attention to die volatile cultural pluralism at home.
The Chilean expatriate, Ariel Dorfman, has written that 'there may be
no better way for a country to know itself than to examine the myths
and popular symbols that it exports to its economic and military dominions.' (48)

Disruption of global hierarchies, by empowering the perspectives
of former colonies, works in sync with pluralization of the core.
The process of global empowerment is particularly interestingly
expressed: Rushdie's well-chosen metaphors about the English
language—that it now grows from many roots, and former colonials are carving out large territories in it—suggest that, in the postcolonial world, English is no longer the possession of the English,
and that, once deterritorialized, it is being pluralized by being
colonized, in reverse, by those it once dominated. For example,
as post-colonial literary theory argues, there are now a number of
different Shakespeares—Shakespeares read from a number of
different hermeneutic positions. One can chart, for example, a
large number of post-colonial interpretations of The Tempest, from
George Lamming to Houston Baker. Thus a single discourse—
like the single world system which it helps constitute—is being
pluralized by contending viewpoints. Dorfman's comment then
suggests further how systematically interconnected and interactive that pluralism is, in that he can meaningfully argue that the
key to the self-knowledge of the core lies now in the experience of
the periphery.
Such positions become especially challenging when one realizes that what is true for the discourse of "English" literature can
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be applied to all the other discourses exported from core to former
colonies: discourses that range from historiography, as analyzed
by Gyan Prakesh, to anthropology, as theorized byjames Clifford.
In anthropology, for example, theoretical dispute has been fueled
by examination of issues such as the power relations involved in
the relationship between investigator and the people he/she studies, how those power relations affect cultural representation, and
what happens as the role of the native informant becomes enlarged, or when those who formerly might have been native informants become the ethnographers. The abyss between this selfreflexive methodological inquiry and a cultural relativist position
should be clear: we are not dealing with a struggle between different ethno-discourses, but with contests for mastery of a common discourse, which, however, have the effect of radically pluralizing it
What Wallerstein, Wolf, Jameson, Lash, Urry, and these approaches all share is an emphasis on studying the world as an
interconnected system. They insist on seeing the relevance of global factors to what were formerly local studies. Thus, the discourses of specific disciplines like anthropology, for example, are reconceived in the context of worldwide colonial power relations,
and supposedly national literary traditions are reinterpreted as
traditions constructed out of international power relations. The
new orders of heterogeneity created by contesting western-originated discourses are very different, however, from the postmodernist cultural fragmentation Jameson, Lash, and Urry described—
which, as we have seen, was at variance with the notion of cultural
difference in Wallerstein. First, both core and periphery, and the
relations between them, are pluralized. Second, this sort of heterogeneity privileges minority and third world positions, not the first
world service class. Finally, the new differences produced are produced as part of a process of contest and active agency; they see
themselves as oppositional to dominant commercial culture, not
a product of it. Once again, then, an increasing perception of
world-interconnectedness produces new orders of differentiation.
Aijun Appadurai's remarkable article, "Difference and Disjunction in the Global Cultural Economy," carries the paradoxical fragmentation of an increasingly interactive world system to the farthest extreme of any theory I know. He fuses post-structuralism
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with World Systems thought, drawing especially heavily on the
sociology of nationalism of Benedict Anderson.
Appadurai's world system is so complexly interactive it no longer has a core and a periphery or, for that matter, a visual izable,
Euclidian structure. It is composed of five different kinds of flow,
each of which he images as a "fluid and irregular," rapidly shifting
landscape. Privileging culture equally with economics, Appadurai
singles out "five dimensions of global flow": "(a) ethnoscapes, (b)
mediascapes, (c) technoscapes, (d) fmanscapes, and (e) ideoscapes" (6-7). Presumably, in a centered world, each of these -scapes
would be anchored in the core: population would flow there for
work, media would emanate from there, technology, investment,
and ideology likewise. Now, however, these different -scapes are
not centered in any core, and they also operate separately from
each other; further, relations between them are
not objectively given relations which look the same from every angle of
vision, b u t . . . are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political situatedness of different sorts of actors:
nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities, as well as sub-national groupings and movements (whether religious, political or economic) and even intimate face-to-face groups, such as villages, neighbourhoods and families. (7)

In this "many-worlds" interpretation of the single global system,
the relations between the -scapes (i.e. the plural system) look and
are different from every social, cultural, and ideological site, as
well as every place throughout the world. The same global system
is differently constructed according to whether you are in Lahore
or London, and also whether you are a Pakistani in London or an
Anglican in London, or a Pakistani who sees herself as a representative of a nation-state or one who feels himself a part of a religious diaspora; indeed, given the social complexity of a world in
which everyone is a member of a number of "imagined communities," you are inevitably not just one, but two, three, four, or more
different figures. For the number of imagined communities has
multiplied exponentially in the contemporary world. If Benedict
Anderson based his notion of the imagined national community
on the development of print capitalism, Appadurai uses the development of electronic media to argue for the existence of a new
system, a vasdy more complex, fundamentally post-national net-
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work of imagined communities. When Appadurai speculates about
how to construct a general theory of so fragmented and plural a
system, he makes it clear, following Lyotard, that the system is so
pluralized, it is not totalizable, and it can only be conceptualized
in non-Euclidean terms. Thus, Appadurai, like Janet Abu-Lughod
at the end of Before European Hegemony, resorts to contemporary
science for concepts and terminology: cultural forms are "fractally-shaped" and "polythetically overlapping," and their dynamics
can only be described by something like "chaos theory."
With Appadurai, we move to a theory that privileges the sort of
celebration of syncretic difference we found in Pico Iyer: in this
fragmented world system, imagined communities are not erased
by homogenization, but exponentially proliferate as global communications draw the world together, increasing thereby its interactivity. This position seems the natural extension of the poststructural critique of the centered global system: it is the ultimate in
decentering. At the same time, it has jettisoned one of the key
assumptions of that critique, and, in doing so, become, like Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition and like some postmodern thought
in other areas, as oddly conservative as the other was radical. In
Appadurai, Wallerstein's hierarchy and the narrative of colonial
domination have been so thoroughly deconstructed, they are no
longer driving forces of history and, therefore, sources for radical
position-taking. Appadurai does not subversively decenter an illegitimately-centered system; he describes a system which is already
decentered. The centered past remains only as part of the contextual information we need to have to chart the perspectival complexity of the new, plural, interactive global system. This is, if you
will pardon the phrase, a post-post-colonial world system.
Appadurai's global system finds its closest equivalent in fiction in the work of another East Indian-American writer, Bharati
Mukheijee. Mukheijee sees her immigrant characters as multi-situated actors, negotiating a global system of bafflingly decentered
heterogeneity. In her memorable story, "Nostalgia," Mukheijee
chronicles a day in the life of an East Indian-American psychiatrist, Manny Patel. At the opening of the story, he has just subdued, with the help of an African-American guard, several Jamaican nurses, and a Korean colleague, a mental patient, who is the
descendent of Eastern European Jews, and who imitates, in his
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madness, Noel Coward, calling Patel in an exquisite English accent "Paki scum," an epithet distincdy British, but not taken from
the language of the class Coward depicted. In such a milieu, globalization of culture has produced not homogenization, but a precise heterogeneity of cultural reference.
In a recent New York Times Book Review piece, Mukheijee wrote
of her legacy as a post-colonial writer:
from childhood, we learned how to be two things simultaneously; to be
the dispossessed as well as the dispossessor. In textbooks, we read of
"our" great empire and triumphs (meaning British), "our" great achievements in the arts (meaning the Moslem Moguls) and "our" treachery in
the Sepoy Mutiny (meaning "native" troops). History forced us to see
ourselves as both the "we" and the "other," and our language reflected
our simultaneity. In time, after independence, the Mutiny became the
first great patriot uprising, a war of liberation. Mahatma Gandhi, always
suspect in the Bengal of my childhood, was simultaneously the Great
Soul beloved of the West and the scruffy low-caste politician who permitted the dismemberment of India. (It's the privilege of the once-ruled
to change their history and nomenclature. There sure no absolutes, only
correct contexts). Perhaps it is this history-mandated training in seeing
myself as "the other" that now heaps on me a fluid set of identities
denied to most of my mainstream American counterparts. (29)

Like Appadurai, Mukherjee moves, stardingly, from a clear-cut
identification with the position of the marginalized writer struggling to pluralize an illegitimately centered system to that of a still
more fragmented figure inhabiting an already-pluralized world
system. By interpreting herself as both dispossessed and dispossessor, she additionally fractures her identity and empowers herself
more thoroughly as person and writer according to the logic of
the radical critique of centered systems: she is in a position to
reveal still further sorts of multiplicities concealed behind this
system than those who are merely dispossessed. At the same time,
with that very step "forward," a gulf opens up between her and
the radical position from which she started: she places herself on
both sides of the political fence and presents a world in which the
centered system of colonial domination has been so dispersed it is
no longer available for radical position-taking. She sees instead a
world in which there are "no absolutes, only correct contexts,"
one in which the narrative of domination has lost its determinative force and survives instead as information. Appadurai and
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Mukheijee present worlds so complex and interrelated that they
cannot be totalized: acdon becomes a local possibility only as the
overall system becomes more fractal, polythene, specularly complex.
Such post-post-colonial positions will appear to some, of course,
as more mystifications behind which the oppressive forces of late
capitalism carry out their dark work. They will seem to be the
contemporary substitute for the notions of universalism and national culture that allowed nation-state capitalism to control its
labor force: this sort of multiculturalism may appear to be a means
of reproducing an exploitable labor force for the era of multinationals. Others, however, may find that the force of the radical
critique of centered structures is realized in them at last that the
world system has been fully decentered in both core and periphery and a new, media-created, information-based technology has
given birth to a culturally richer, post-national society. In such an
era, Sally Falk Moore's description of the problematic pluralization of the word "culture," once it is detached from national and
ethnic structures, might no longer seem to be problematic:
at what point do we say the density of differences of values, symbols, or
practices in any setting constitute 'cultural' differences? Why are there
differences between a Japanese factory and a British factory producing
the same objects? Is there an American Air Force 'culture' that is different from an American Navy 'culture'? Is the 'culture' of a physics laboratory different from the 'culture' of a machine shop? If it is reasonable
to speak of the culture and ethnicity as Ahmed does of the North-West
frontier of Pakistan, what do we mean by culture and ethnicity? (39)

However one regards the political implications of Appadurai's
and Mukheijee's positions, the socio-cultural world they describe
appears to be a ne plus ultra in the series of conceptualizations of
the world I have been presenting. In all of these different versions
of the world system, the spectre of homogenization is a fiction. All
theories entail notions of system-created difference. As the systems
described, moreover, become more and more decentered, this
system-created difference multiplies; indeed, it multiplies to the
point that non-Euclidean, non-synthetic, interruptively plural world
systems need be invented. Perhaps, to lay homogenization triply
to rest, we need to accept the fact that we can no longer easily
speak of "the" modern world system, but need to master an arche-
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ology of changing conceptualizations of it, all of which have relevance to the present. Thus, to the cultural differences created by
the world system itself, we must add the different concepts of culture created by an increasingly complex, layered growth of world
systems.
Queens College
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